Electromagnetic radiation from video display units: an eavesdropping risk?
Computers and Security
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Simulation models for side-channel information leaks
Proceedings of the 42nd annual Design Automation Conference
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Understanding voltage variations in chip multiprocessors using a distributed power-delivery network
Proceedings of the conference on Design, automation and test in Europe
Investigations of power analysis attacks on smartcards
WOST'99 Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology on USENIX Workshop on Smartcard Technology
Proceedings of the 44th annual Design Automation Conference
CMOS VLSI Design: A Circuits and Systems Perspective
CMOS VLSI Design: A Circuits and Systems Perspective
On second-order differential power analysis
CHES'05 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Cryptographic hardware and embedded systems
Using Virtual Secure Circuit to Protect Embedded Software from Side-Channel Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
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Side-channel attack (SCA) is a method in which an attacker aims at extracting secret information from crypto chips by analyzing physical parameters (e.g. power). SCA has emerged as a serious threat to many mathematically unbreakable cryptography systems. From an attacker's point of view, the difficulty of mounting SCA largely depends on Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the side-channel information. It has been shown that SNR primarily depends on algorithmic and circuit-level implementation, measurement noise, as well as device thermal noise. However, to the best of our knowledge, there has not been any study on the effect of power delivery network (PDN) on SCA resistance. We note that the PDN plays a significant role in SNR of measured supply current. Furthermore, SCA resistance strongly depends on the operating frequency due to RLC structure of a power grid. In this paper, we analyze the effect of power grid on SCA and provide quantitative results to demonstrate the frequency-dependent SCA resistance due to PDN-induced noise. This property can potentially be exploited by an attacker to facilitate the attack by operating a device at favorable frequency points. On the other hand, from a designer's perspective, one can explore countermeasures to secure the device at all operating frequencies while minimizing the design overhead. Based on this observation, we propose a frequency-dependent noise-injection based compensation technique to efficiently protect against SCA. Simulation results using realistic PDN model as well as experimental measurements using FPGA test board validate the observations on role of PDN in SCA and the efficacy of the proposed compensation approach.