A Countermeasure against One Physical Cryptanalysis May Benefit Another Attack
ICISC '01 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference Seoul on Information Security and Cryptology
Towards Sound Approaches to Counteract Power-Analysis Attacks
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '00 Proceedings of the 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Universal Exponentiation Algorithm
CHES '01 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
TinyPK: securing sensor networks with public key technology
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Side Channel Cryptanalysis on XTR Public Key Cryptosystem*
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
CT-RSA'03 Proceedings of the 2003 RSA conference on The cryptographers' track
On XTR and side-channel analysis
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Public key cryptography in sensor networks—revisited
ESAS'04 Proceedings of the First European conference on Security in Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
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Recently, XTR is considered as one of good candidates for more energy efficient cryptosystems. Among the family of XTR algorithms, the Improved XTR Single Exponentiation (XTR-ISE) is the most efficient one suitable for ubiquitous computer. Even though the security of such devices against side channel attacks is very dangerous, there are few works on side channel attacks against XTR-ISE. In this paper we propose a new collision attack on XTR-ISE. The analysis complexity of the proposed one is about 240 where the key size is 160-bit, which is 55% improvement from the previously best known analysis of Page-Stam. We also propose a novel countermeasure using a fixed pattern which is secure against SPA. In the sense of both efficiency and security the proposed countermeasure is the best one among the previous countermeasures- it is about 30% faster.