Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Handbook of Applied Cryptography
Strength of Two Data Encryption Standard Implementations under Timing Attacks
LATIN '98 Proceedings of the Third Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
A Practical Implementation of the Timing Attack
CARDIS '98 Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card Research and Applications
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Combined Timing and Power Attack
PKC '02 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptosystems: Public Key Cryptography
A Timing Attack against RSA with the Chinese Remainder Theorem
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Remote timing attacks are practical
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
A Computer Algorithm for Calculating the Product AB Modulo M
IEEE Transactions on Computers
On the optimization of side-channel attacks by advanced stochastic methods
PKC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography
Hi-index | 0.00 |
In this paper, we introduce a timing attack scheme against a 160-bit modular multiplication with Blakley's algorithm. It is assumed that a set of public inputs are multiplied by a secret parameter and running time of each multiplication is given, but the multiplication result is not known and a machine similar to victim machine isn't available. The proposed attack extracts all 160 bits of the secret parameter. Running time of Blakley's algorithm is analyzed and it is shown that running time of each step is dependent on the running time of other steps. The dependencies make the parameters of the attack be dependent on the secret key, while it makes the attack rather complicated. A heuristic algorithm is used to find the parameters of the attack. As a real scenario, the attack is applied against on-line implementation of Digital Signature Algorithm, which employs Blakley's modular multiplication. Practical results show that secret key of DSA will be found using 1,000,000 timing samples.