Introduction to algorithms
Introduction to signal processing
Introduction to signal processing
Examining Smart-Card Security under the Threat of Power Analysis Attacks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-Measures for Smart Cards
E-SMART '01 Proceedings of the International Conference on Research in Smart Cards: Smart Card Programming and Security
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
CRYPTO '96 Proceedings of the 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Differential Power Analysis in the Presence of Hardware Countermeasures
CHES '00 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards (Advances in Information Security)
CHES '08 Proceeding sof the 10th international workshop on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems
Information Security and Cryptology --- ICISC 2008
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
EUROCRYPT '09 Proceedings of the 28th Annual International Conference on Advances in Cryptology: the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Ways to enhance differential power analysis
ICISC'02 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information security and cryptology
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Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks extract secret key information from cryptographic devices by comparing power consumption with predicted values based on key candidates and looking for peaks which indicate a correct prediction. A general obstacle in the use of DPA is the occurrence of so called ghost peaks, which may appear when evaluating incorrect key candidates. Some ghost peaks can be expected from the structure and may actually leak information. We introduce a DPA enhancement technique--Euclidean Differential Power Analysis (EDPA), which makes use of the information leaked by the ghost peaks to diminish the ghost peaks themselves and bring forward the correct key candidate. The EDPA can be combined with any standard DPA attack irrespective of the distinguisher used. We illustrate that EDPA improves on DPA with both simulations and experiments on smart cards.