Analysing a Stream Authentication Protocol Using Model Checking

  • Authors:
  • Philippa J. Broadfoot;Gavin Lowe

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS '02 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2002

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Abstract

In this paper, we consider how one can analyse a stream authentication protocol using model checking techniques. In particular, we focus on the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication Protocol, TESLA. This protocol differs from the standard class of authentication protocols previously analysed using model checking techniques in the following interesting way: an unbounded stream of messages is broadcast by a sender, making use of an unbounded stream of keys; the authentication of the n-th message in the stream is achieved on receipt of the n + 1-th message. We show that, despite the infinite nature of the protocol, it is possible to build a finite model that correctly captures its behaviour.