A simple framework for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis with compositional proof rules
Science of Computer Programming - Special issue on 12th European symposium on programming (ESOP 2003)
Extending noninterference properties to the timed world
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Information flow security in dynamic contexts
Journal of Computer Security
Non-Interference Control Synthesis for Security Timed Automata
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Towards Information Flow Properties for Distributed Systems
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Quantifying Security for Timed Process Algebras
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Securing Statically-verified Communications Protocols Against Timing Attacks
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Information-flow attacks based on limited observations
PSI'06 Proceedings of the 6th international Andrei Ershov memorial conference on Perspectives of systems informatics
A simple language for real-time cryptographic protocol analysis
ESOP'03 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Programming
Hiding information in multi level security systems
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
Process Algebra Contexts and Security Properties
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Quantifying Security for Timed Process Algebras
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Probabilistic Information Flow Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Observation Based System Security
Fundamenta Informaticae - Special Issue on Concurrency Specification and Programming (CS&P)
Information flow in systems with schedulers, Part I: Definitions
Theoretical Computer Science
Informational Analysis of Security and Integrity
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming CS&P
Quantification of Positive and Negative Attacker's Information
Fundamenta Informaticae - Concurrency Specification and Programming CS&P
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In previous work, we studied some noninterference properties for information flow analysis in computer systems on classic (possibilistic) labeled transition systems. In this paper, some of these properties, notably bisimulation-based nondeducibility on compositions (BNDC), are reformulated in a real-time setting. This is done by first enhancing the security process algebra proposed by two of the authors with some extra constructs to model real-time systems (in a discrete time setting), and then by studying the natural extension of these properties in this enriched setting. We prove essentially the same results known for the untimed case: ordering relation among properties, compositionality aspects, partial model checking techniques. Finally, we illustrate the approach through two case studies, where in both cases the untimed specification is secure, while the timed specification may show up interesting timing covert channels.