Theoretical Computer Science
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Constraint solving for bounded-process cryptographic protocol analysis
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol: A Comparison of Two Approaches
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Finite-State Analysis of Security Protocols
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Tree Automata with One Memory, Set Constraints, and Ping-Pong Protocols
ICALP '01 Proceedings of the 28th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming,
Modelling and verifying key-exchange protocols using CSP and FDR
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Meta-Notation for Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Compositional Logic for Protocol Correctness
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Formal security analysis of PKCS#11 and proprietary extensions
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
Model checking a networked system without the network
Proceedings of the 8th USENIX conference on Networked systems design and implementation
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The Dolev-Yao model of security protocol analysis may beformalized using a notation based on multi-set rewriting with existential quantification. This presentation describes the multiset rewriting approach to security protocol analysis, algorithmic upper and lower bounds on specific forms of protocol analysis, and some of the ways this model is useful for formalizing sublte properties of specific protocols.