A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode

  • Authors:
  • Michael Backes;Matthias Berg;Dominique Unruh

  • Affiliations:
  • Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany and MPI-SWS,;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany;Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany

  • Venue:
  • LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

Game-based cryptographic proofs are typically expressed using pseudocode, which lacks a formal semantics. This can lead to ambiguous specifications, hidden mistakes, and even wrong proofs. We propose a language for expressing proofs that is expressive enough to specify all constructs occurring in cryptographic games, including probabilistic behaviors, the usage of oracles, and polynomial-time programs. The language is a probabilistic higher-order lambda calculus with recursive types, references, and support for events, and is simple enough that researchers without a strong background in the theory of programming languages can understand it. The language has been implemented in the proof assistant Isabelle/HOL.