A Concrete Security Treatment of Symmetric Encryption
FOCS '97 Proceedings of the 38th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
SP '06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Logics for reasoning about cryptographic constructions
Journal of Computer and System Sciences - Special issue on FOCS 2003
Towards Producing Formally Checkable Security Proofs, Automatically
CSF '08 Proceedings of the 2008 21st IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Formal certification of code-based cryptographic proofs
Proceedings of the 36th annual ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT symposium on Principles of programming languages
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Pseudocode
LPAR '08 Proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Logic for Programming, Artificial Intelligence, and Reasoning
Formal Certification of ElGamal Encryption
Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
Proofs of randomized algorithms in Coq
Science of Computer Programming
The Computational SLR: A Logic for Reasoning about Computational Indistinguishability
TLCA '09 Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Typed Lambda Calculi and Applications
Why provable security matters?
EUROCRYPT'03 Proceedings of the 22nd international conference on Theory and applications of cryptographic techniques
Indistinguishability amplification
CRYPTO'07 Proceedings of the 27th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
A framework for game-based security proofs
ICICS'07 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information and communications security
A calculus for game-based security proofs
ProvSec'10 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Provable security
On the equality of probabilistic terms
LPAR'10 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Logic for programming, artificial intelligence, and reasoning
A probabilistic hoare-style logic for game-based cryptographic proofs
ICALP'06 Proceedings of the 33rd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming - Volume Part II
The security of triple encryption and a framework for code-based game-playing proofs
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Probabilistic compositional reasoning for guaranteeing fault tolerance properties
OPODIS'11 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Principles of Distributed Systems
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Correctness of cryptosystems is in many cases an important prerequisite for trusting security relevant systems. Even cryptosystems with tiny specifications are often hard for humans to understand. It can be difficult to reason about them and to convince oneself that distinct security properties do indeed hold. Even mathematical "proofs" -- carried out with paper and pencil -- which are intended to show the strength of a cryptosystem with respect to some attacker model have turned out to be error prone. In this paper we address the problem of establishing trusted properties of cryptosystems. We report on proving the security of the ElGamal and Hashed ElGamal encryption schemes within Coq. Security is shown with respect to Real-or-Random chosen plaintext attacks (ROR-CPA). This work is a prototypical case study for a novel approach: having defined a framework for the specification of cryptographic processes and general rules for decomposing cryptographic proofs into smaller units we use this framework to specify the involved schemes and attack model. The defined rules are used to represent the overall security proof layout. They are proven sound with respect to basic mathematical properties. To achieve a formal security proof remaining goals are proven by special tactics or in an interactive way using the basic mathematical properties.