Computational indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Finite models for formal security proofs
Journal of Computer Security - 7th International Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'07)
Beyond provable security verifiable IND-CCA security of OAEP
CT-RSA'11 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Topics in cryptology: CT-RSA 2011
Proving the security of ElGamal encryption via indistinguishability logic
Proceedings of the 2011 ACM Symposium on Applied Computing
ASIAN'09 Proceedings of the 13th Asian conference on Advances in Computer Science: information Security and Privacy
Integrating automated and interactive protocol verification
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
SCADA system security, complexity, and security proof
ICPCA/SWS'12 Proceedings of the 2012 international conference on Pervasive Computing and the Networked World
Journal of Automated Reasoning
Establishing and preserving protocol security goals
Journal of Computer Security - Foundational Aspects of Security
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First-order logic models of security for cryptographic protocols, based on variants of the Dolev-Yao model, are now well-established tools. Given that we have checked a given security protocol pi using a given first-order prover, how hard is it to extract a formally checkable proof of it, as required in, e.g., common criteria at evaluation level 7? We demonstrate that this is surprisingly hard: the problem is non-recursive in general. On the practical side, we show how we can extract finite models M from a set S of clauses representing pi, automatically, in two ways. We then define a model-checker testing M |= S, and show how we can instrument it to output a formally checkable proof, e.g., in Coq. This was implemented in the h1 tool suite. Experience on a number of protocols shows that this is practical.