Zero-knowledge proofs of identity
Journal of Cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A Bisimulation Method for Cryptographic Protocols
ESOP '98 Proceedings of the 7th European Symposium on Programming: Programming Languages and Systems
Secure Length-Saving ElGamal Encryption under the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption
ACISP '00 Proceedings of the 5th Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
REACT: Rapid Enhanced-Security Asymmetric Cryptosystem Transform
CT-RSA 2001 Proceedings of the 2001 Conference on Topics in Cryptology: The Cryptographer's Track at RSA
Chosen-Ciphertext Security for Any One-Way Cryptosystem
PKC '00 Proceedings of the Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable Dolev-Yao Style Cryptographic Library
CSFW '04 Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards automated proofs for asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model
Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Computational soundness of formal indistinguishability and static equivalence
ASIAN'06 Proceedings of the 11th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: secure software and related issues
About the security of ciphers (semantic security and pseudo-random permutations)
SAC'04 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Selected Areas in Cryptography
Guessing attacks and the computational soundness of static equivalence
FOSSACS'06 Proceedings of the 9th European joint conference on Foundations of Software Science and Computation Structures
Computationally sound implementations of equational theories against passive adversaries
ICALP'05 Proceedings of the 32nd international conference on Automata, Languages and Programming
Computationally sound, automated proofs for security protocols
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Completing the picture: soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Automated security proofs with sequences of games
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and key-exchange protocols
TCC'06 Proceedings of the Third conference on Theory of Cryptography
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Several generic constructions for transforming one-way functions to asymmetric encryption schemes have been proposed. One-way functions only guarantee the weak secrecy of their arguments. That is, given the image by a one-way function of a random value, an adversary has only negligible probability to compute this random value. Encryption schemes must guarantee a stronger secrecy notion. They must be at least resistant against indistinguishability-attacks under chosen plaintext text (IND-CPA). Most practical constructions have been proved in the random oracle model (ROM for short). Such computational proofs turn out to be complex and error prone. Bana et al. have introduced Formal Indistinguishability Relations (FIR), as an abstraction of computational indistinguishability. In this paper, we extend the notion of FIR to cope with the ROM on one hand and adaptive adversaries on the other hand. Indeed, when dealing with hash functions in the ROM and one-way functions, it is important to correctly abstract the notion of weak secrecy. Moreover, one needs to extend frames to include adversaries in order to capture security notions as IND-CPA. To fix these problems, we consider pairs of formal indistinguishability relations and formal nonderivability relations. We provide a general framework along with general theorems, that ensure soundness of our approach and then we use our new framework to verify several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare Rogaway and Hashed ElGamal.