A study on computational formal verification for practical cryptographic protocol: the case of synchronous RFID authentication

Authors:
Yoshikazu HanataniI;Miyako Ohkubo;Shin'ichiro Matsuo;Kazuo Sakiyama;Kazuo Ohta
Affiliations:
Toshiba Corporation, Kawasaki-shi, Kanagawa, Japan,The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, Tokyo, Japan;The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Koganei, Tokyo, Japan;The National Institute of Information and Communications Technology, Koganei, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, Tokyo, Japan;The University of Electro-Communications, Chofu-shi, Tokyo, Japan
Venue:
FC'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
Year:
2011

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Abstract

Formal verification of cryptographic protocols has a long history with a great number of successful verification tools created. Recent progress in formal verification theory has brought more powerful tools capable of handling computational assumption, which leads to more reliable verification results for information systems. In this paper, we introduce an effective scheme and studies on applying computational formal verification toward a practical cryptographic protocol. As a target protocol, we reconsider a security model for RFID authentication with a man-in-the-middle adversary and communication fault. We define three model and security proofs via a game-based approach that, in a computational sense, makes our security models compatible with formal security analysis tools. Then we show the combination of using a computational formal verification tool and handwritten verification to overcome the computational tool's limitations. We show that the target RFID authentication protocol is robust against the above-mentioned attacks, and then provide game-based (handwritten) proofs and their verification via CryptoVerif.