Provably secure browser-based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS

  • Authors:
  • Sebastian Gajek;Mark Manulis;Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi;Jörg Schwenk

  • Affiliations:
  • Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany;Microelectronics Laboratory, Belgium;Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany;Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

The standard solution for user authentication on the Web is to establish a TLS-based secure channel in server authenticated mode and run a protocol on top of TLS where the user enters a password in an HTML form. However, as many studies point out, the average Internet user is unable to identify the server based on a X.509 certificate so that impersonation attacks (e.g., phishing) are feasible. We tackle this problem by proposing a protocol that allows the user to identify the server based on human perceptible authenticators (e.g., picture, voice). We prove the security of this protocol by refining the game-based security model of Bellare and Rogaway and present a proof of concept implementation.