Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Universally Composable Notions of Key Exchange and Secure Channels
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Universally Composable Security: A New Paradigm for Cryptographic Protocols
FOCS '01 Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of Liberty Single-Sign-on with Enabled Clients
IEEE Internet Computing
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
The Emperor's New Security Indicators
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Dynamic pharming attacks and locked same-origin policies for web browsers
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protecting browsers from dns rebinding attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Analyzing Security Protocols Using Time-Bounded Task-PIOAs
Discrete Event Dynamic Systems
Provably secure browser-based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Browser model for security analysis of browser-based protocols
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Mitigating dictionary attacks on password-protected local storage
CRYPTO'06 Proceedings of the 26th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Options for integrating eID and SAML
Proceedings of the 2013 ACM workshop on Digital identity management
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Browser-based security protocols perform cryptographic tasks within the constraints of commodity browsers. They are the bearer protocols for many security critical applications on the Internet. Roughly speaking, they are the offspring of key exchange and secure sessions protocols. Although browser-based protocols are widely deployed, their security has not been formally proved. We provide a security model for the analysis of browser-based protocols based on the Universal Composability framework.