Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Risks of the passport single signon protocol
Proceedings of the 9th international World Wide Web conference on Computer networks : the international journal of computer and telecommunications netowrking
The Order of Encryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (or: How Secure Is SSL?)
CRYPTO '01 Proceedings of the 21st Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Security of RSA Encryption in TLS
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm
ASIACRYPT '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
A Model for Asynchronous Reactive Systems and its Application to Secure Message Transmission
SP '01 Proceedings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Security Analysis of the SAML Single Sign-on Browser/Artifact Profile
ACSAC '03 Proceedings of the 19th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
The battle against phishing: Dynamic Security Skins
SOUPS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 symposium on Usable privacy and security
Proving a WS-federation passive requestor profile with a browser model
Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Secure web services
ACSAC '05 Proceedings of the 21st Annual Computer Security Applications Conference
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
The Emperor's New Security Indicators
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Dynamic pharming attacks and locked same-origin policies for web browsers
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Protecting browsers from dns rebinding attacks
Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
HMAC is a randomness extractor and applications to TLS
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Provably secure browser-based user-aware mutual authentication over TLS
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
An evaluation of extended validation and picture-in-picture phishing attacks
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
WSKE: web server key enabled cookies
FC'07/USEC'07 Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Financial cryptography and 1st International conference on Usable Security
Browser model for security analysis of browser-based protocols
ESORICS'05 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Research in Computer Security
Graphical password authentication using cued click points
ESORICS'07 Proceedings of the 12th European conference on Research in Computer Security
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The standard solution for mutual authentication between human users and servers on the Internet is to execute a TLS handshake during which the server authenticates using a X.509 certificate followed by the authentication of the user either with own password or with some cookie stored within the user's browser. Unfortunately, this solution is susceptible to various impersonation attacks such as phishing as it turned out that average Internet users are unable to authenticate servers based on their certificates.In this paper we address security of cookie-based authenticationusing the concept of strong locked same originpolicy for browsers introduced at ACM CCS'07. We describe a cookie-based authentication protocol between human users and TLS-servers and prove its security in the extended formal model for browser-based mutual authenticationintroduced at ACM ASIACCS'08. It turns out that the small modification of the browser's security policy is sufficient to achieve provably secure cookie-based authentication protocols considering the ability of users to recognize images, video, or audio sequences.