A Browser-Based Kerberos Authentication Scheme

  • Authors:
  • Sebastian Gajek;Tibor Jager;Mark Manulis;Jörg Schwenk

  • Affiliations:
  • Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-University, Bochum, Germany;Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-University, Bochum, Germany;UCL Crypto Group, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;Horst Görtz Institute for IT-Security, Ruhr-University, Bochum, Germany

  • Venue:
  • ESORICS '08 Proceedings of the 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

When two players wish to share a security token (e.g., for the purpose of authentication and accounting), they call a trusted third party. This idea is the essence of Kerberos protocols, which are widely deployed in a large scale of computer networks. Browser-based Kerberos protocols are the derivates with the exception that the Kerberos client application is a commodity Web browser. Whereas the native Kerberos protocol has been repeatedly peer-reviewed without finding flaws, the history of browser-based Kerberos protocols is tarnished with negative results due to the fact that subtleties of browsers have been disregarded. We propose a browser-based Kerberos protocol based on client certificates and prove its security in the extended formal model for browser-based mutual authentication introduced at ACM ASIACCS'08.