A formal analysis for capturing replay attacks in cryptographic protocols

Authors:
Han Gao;Chiara Bodei;Pierpaolo Degano;Hanne Riis Nielson
Affiliations:
Informatics and Mathematical Modelling, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy;Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy;Informatics and Mathematical Modelling, Technical University of Denmark, Lyngby, Denmark
Venue:
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We present a reduction semantics for the LYSA calculus extended with session information, for modelling cryptographic protocols, and a static analysis for it. If a protocol passes the analysis then it is free of replay attacks and thus preserves freshness. The analysis has been implemented and applied to a number of protocols, including both original and corrected version of Needham-Schroeder protocol. The experiment results show that the analysis is able to capture potential replay attacks.