Integrating security in a large distributed system
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '02 Proceedings of the 15th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Flow logic: a multi-paradigmatic approach to static analysis
The essence of computation
Roles in Cryptographic Protocols
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A calculus for control flow analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on security in global computing
Analysis of LYSA-calculus with explicit confidentiality annotations
AINA '06 Proceedings of the 20th International Conference on Advanced Information Networking and Applications - Volume 02
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Cryptographic Pattern Matching
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A Formal Analysis of Complex Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
AMAST 2008 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
A formal analysis for capturing replay attacks in cryptographic protocols
ASIAN'07 Proceedings of the 12th Asian computing science conference on Advances in computer science: computer and network security
Detecting and preventing type flaws at static time
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
Non-repudiation analysis using LySa with annotations
Computer Languages, Systems and Structures
Flow Logic for Process Calculi
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Trusted multiplexing of cryptographic protocols
FAST'09 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust
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A type flaw attack on a security protocol is an attack where an honest principal is cheated on interpreting a field in a message as the one with a type other than the intended one. In this paper, we shall present an extension of the LySa calculus with tags attached to each field, indicating the intended types. We developed a control flow analysis for analysing the extended LySa, which over-approximates all the possible behaviour of a protocol and hence is able to capture any type confusion that may happen during the protocol execution. The control flow analysis has been applied to a number of security protocols, either subject to type flaw attacks or not. The results show that it is able to capture type flaw attacks on those security protocols.