On key distribution protocols for repeated authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Authentication in distributed systems: a bibliography
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Adding time to a logic of authentication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
An approach to the formal verification of cryptographic protocols
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
On the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
On the relationship between strand spaces and multi-agent systems
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Cross-layer verification of type flaw attacks on security protocols
ACSC '07 Proceedings of the thirtieth Australasian conference on Computer science - Volume 62
Detecting and Preventing Type flaws: a Control Flow Analysis with Tags
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A Formal Analysis of Complex Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
AMAST 2008 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Algebraic Methodology and Software Technology
Two attacks on Neuman-Stubblebine authentication protocols
Information Processing Letters
Detecting and preventing type flaws at static time
Journal of Computer Security - Security Issues in Concurrency (SecCo'07)
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ln protocols for the distribution of symmetric keys, aprincipal will usually either take on the role as a session key provider or-as a session key user. A principaltaking on the role as session key user may also act asthe master or the slave. We show that methods fop theanalysis of cryptographic protocols that fail to properlyhandle multiple roles do not yield dependable results.We present a protocol KP, similar to the Needhamand Schroeder symmetric hey distribution protocol. Bymeans of an example, we then show how a multi roleflaw in KP can be utilized by an adversary to obtaina session key.Using a method due to Burrows, Abadi and Needham [3], and the one due to Bieber [1], we show that KP seems to be suitable for secure key distribution. Finally, the approach due to Bieber is modified facilitate the detection of the class of multi role flaws