ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A nonce-based protocol for multiple authentications
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Adding time to a logic of authentication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
A critique of the Burrows, Abadi and Needham logic
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Roles in Cryptographic Protocols
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
A Logical Language for Specifying Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Adding time to a logic of authentication
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Optimal privacy and authentication on a portable communications system
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A lesson on authentication protocol design
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
An efficient and secure authentication protocol using uncertified keys
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue dedicated to Gustavus J. Simmons
On the properties of cryptographic protocols and the weaknesses of the BAN-like logics
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
On a session key compromise problem in [KC95] protocol
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
The Logic of Authentication Protocols
FOSAD '00 Revised versions of lectures given during the IFIP WG 1.7 International School on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design on Foundations of Security Analysis and Design: Tutorial Lectures
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A provable secure authentication protocol given forward secure session key
APWeb'08 Proceedings of the 10th Asia-Pacific web conference on Progress in WWW research and development
Research note: Group-oriented authentication mechanism with key exchange
Computer Communications
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In [KSL92], Kehne et al. present a protocol (KSL) for key distribution. Their protocol allows for repeated authentication by means of a ticket. They also give a proof in BAN logic [BAN89] that the protocol provides the principals with a reasonable degree of trust in the authentication and key distribution. They present an optimality result that their protocol contains a minimal number of messages. Nonetheless, in [NS93] Neuman and Stubblebine present a protocol (NS) as an explicit alternative to KSL that requires one less message in the initial authentication and key distribution. One goal of this paper is to examine some of the reasons for this discrepancy. Another goal is to demonstrate possible attacks on NS. Like any attacks on cryptographic protocols, these depend on assumptions about implementation details. But, when possible they are serious: a penetrator can initiate the protocol, masquerade as another principal, obtain the session key, and even generate the session key herself.1 We will set out implementation assumptions required for the attacks to take place and implementation assumptions that preclude such an attack. We will also look at other protocols, including one that is not subject to this form of attack and has the same number of messages as NS. Finally, we will briefly discuss the logical analysis of these repeat authentication protocols.