ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
On key distribution protocols for repeated authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
The KryptoKnight family of light-weight protocols for authentication and key distribution
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
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Communications of the ACM
Journal of Systems and Software
Limitations of the Kerberos authentication system
ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
KryptoKnight Authentication and Key Distribution System
ESORICS '92 Proceedings of the Second European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Yaksha: augmenting Kerberos with public key cryptography
SNDSS '95 Proceedings of the 1995 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security (SNDSS'95)
Distributed Authentication in Kerberos Using Public Key Cryptography
SNDSS '97 Proceedings of the 1997 Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security
A hybrid authentication protocol for large mobile network
Journal of Systems and Software
A new efficient authentication protocol for mobile networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key
ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part II
An authenticated key exchange to improve the security of Shi et al. and Kim et al.'s protocols
WISM'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Web information systems and mining - Volume Part I
A security enhanced authentication and key distribution protocol for wireless networks
Security and Communication Networks
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This paper proposes a key distribution and authentication protocol between user, service provider and key distribution center (KDC). This protocol is based on symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component and hash function. In proposed protocol, user and server update the session key under token-update operation, and user can process repeated efficient authentications by using updated session keys. Another merit is that KDC needs not to totally control the session key between user and server in proposed protocol. Even if an attacker steals the parameters from the KDC, the attacker still can not calculate session key. We use BAN logic to proof these merits of our proposed protocol. Also according to the comparison and analysis with other protocols, our proposed protocol provides good efficiency and forward secure session key.