An authenticated key exchange to improve the security of Shi et al. and Kim et al.'s protocols

  • Authors:
  • Mijin Kim;Changyoung Kwon;Dongho Won

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea;Department of Computer Information, DongSeoul University, Sungnam-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Gyeonggi-do, Korea

  • Venue:
  • WISM'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Web information systems and mining - Volume Part I
  • Year:
  • 2011

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Abstract

Understanding security failures of authenticated key exchange protocols is the key to both patching existing protocols and designing future protocols. In 2009, Kim et al. proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol to improve the security of Shi et al.'s protocol between user, service provider, and key distribution center (KDC). The protocol was based on the symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component, and hash function. This paper proves how, Kim et al.'s protocol fails to achieve its basic goal of securely establishing a common secret key among communication parties. We also present how to resolve the security problems of the protocol.