Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
An efficient and secure authentication protocol using uncertified keys
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A hybrid authentication protocol for large mobile network
Journal of Systems and Software
Cryptanalysis of a hybrid authentication protocol for large mobile networks
Journal of Systems and Software
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key
ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part II
A new efficient authentication protocol for mobile networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Enhancement of two-factor authenticated key exchange protocols in public wireless LANs
Computers and Electrical Engineering
A provable secure authentication protocol given forward secure session key
APWeb'08 Proceedings of the 10th Asia-Pacific web conference on Progress in WWW research and development
On the security of an novel protocol for downloadable CAS
Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Ubiquitous Information Management and Communication
Hi-index | 0.00 |
Understanding security failures of authenticated key exchange protocols is the key to both patching existing protocols and designing future protocols. In 2009, Kim et al. proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol to improve the security of Shi et al.'s protocol between user, service provider, and key distribution center (KDC). The protocol was based on the symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component, and hash function. This paper proves how, Kim et al.'s protocol fails to achieve its basic goal of securely establishing a common secret key among communication parties. We also present how to resolve the security problems of the protocol.