A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A key distribution system equivalent to factoring
Journal of Cryptology
How to sign given any trapdoor function
STOC '88 Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Universal one-way hash functions and their cryptographic applications
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
On the theory of average case complexity
STOC '89 Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks
STOC '90 Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
DIGITALIZED SIGNATURES AND PUBLIC-KEY FUNCTIONS AS INTRACTABLE AS FACTORIZATION
Towards practical “proven secure” authenticated key distribution
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptanalysis of the Chang-Wu-Chen key distribution system
EUROCRYPT '93 Workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A Non-interactive Public-Key Distribution System
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Secure Key-Evolving Protocols for Discrete Logarithm Schemes
CT-RSA '02 Proceedings of the The Cryptographer's Track at the RSA Conference on Topics in Cryptology
The Risks of Compromising Secret Information
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Perfectly-Secure Key Distribution for Dynamic Conferences
CRYPTO '92 Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Risk of Opening Distributed Keys
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Key Escrow System with Warrant Bounds
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Two-Pass Authenticated Key Arrangement Protocol with Key Confirmation
INDOCRYPT '00 Proceedings of the First International Conference on Progress in Cryptology
How to Utilize the Randomness of Zero-Knowledge Proofs
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key
ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part II
Non-interactive public-key cryptography
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Batch Diffie-Hellmam key agreement systems and their application to portable communications
EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Secure conference key distribution schemes for conspiracy attack
EUROCRYPT'92 Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Robust authentication and key agreement scheme preserving the privacy of secret key
Computer Communications
An authenticated key exchange to improve the security of Shi et al. and Kim et al.'s protocols
WISM'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Web information systems and mining - Volume Part I
Provably secure three-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Secure password authentication for keystroke dynamics
KES'05 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Knowledge-Based Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems - Volume Part III
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The so called, Rabin "paradox" is a proof that a given signature system, which is secure under ciphertext only attack is insecure under chosen message attack. The construction that is used to prove the first clause is also used to prove the second. For several years it was believed to be inherent to public key signature systems. A similar problem existed for public key cryptosystems (under chosen ciphertext attack). Trap-door functions were inherent in the construction of the "paradox."In 1984 Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest constructively showed that one can overcome the "paradox." Naor and Yung (1989) resolved the similar problem for public key cryptosystems. Both solution actually solve two problems. They resolve the "paradox," with the strictest definition of security (for a cryptosystem it amounts to the demand that for a given cryptogram c and two messages m0, m1 it should be infeasible to decide whether c resulted from m0 or m1 with probability significantly greater than half). Both solutions are very complicated.We show that a similar "paradox" exists foT many key distribution systems, even if non-trapdoor one way functions are used (like in the Diffie-Hellrnan variations). Using the simple basic definition of security (given the messages exchanged during the protocol it should be impossible to find the resulting session key in probabilistic polynomial time) we show a simple and practical key distribution system which is provably free of the paradox.