IEEE Spectrum
ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Zero-knowledge authentication scheme with secret key exchange
CRYPTO '88 Proceedings on Advances in cryptology
An identity-based key-exchange protocol
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Authentication and authenticated key exchanges
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
A new signature scheme based on the DSA giving message recovery
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Towards practical “proven secure” authenticated key distribution
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Digital signatures with RSA and other public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Communications of the ACM
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
CRYPTO '90 Proceedings of the 10th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Systematic Design of Two-Party Authentication Protocols
CRYPTO '91 Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Authenticated group key agreement and friends
CCS '98 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Key Agreement in Dynamic Peer Groups
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
The Risks of Compromising Secret Information
ICICS '02 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information and Communications Security
Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Protocols
SAC '98 Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography
Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
CRYPTO '95 Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Cryptanalysis of tripartite and multi-party authenticated key agreement protocols
Information Sciences: an International Journal
An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices
Theoretical Computer Science
Two improved two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols
Computer Standards & Interfaces
An improved end-to-end secure authentication scheme for CDMA networks
AsiaCSN '07 Proceedings of the Fourth IASTED Asian Conference on Communication Systems and Networks
The GCHQ protocol and its problems
EUROCRYPT'97 Proceedings of the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
On security models and compilers for group key exchange protocols
IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
Proceedings of the fourth ACM conference on Wireless network security
An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Efficient authenticated key agreement protocol for dynamic groups
WISA'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Information Security Applications
Research note: Three ID-based information security functions
Computer Communications
ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
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We describe an insider known-key attack on key distribution systems which are based on public keys. This is of a general type and applies to the key distribution system presented by Yacobi at Crypto '90, the Goss system, the G眉nther system presented at Eurocrypt '89 and the key exchange version of COMSET, based on a system presented by Brandt et al. at Crypto '89. The attack is primarily theoretical, in the sense that it assumes that some session keys are leaked or lost. Well designed systems will prevent this. However it could have practical consequences with certain applications (e.g. negotiation of contracts or poor implementations). We discuss the implications and ways to prevent the attack.