Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
An identity-based key-exchange protocol
EUROCRYPT '89 Proceedings of the workshop on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques on Advances in cryptology
Random oracles are practical: a paradigm for designing efficient protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Provably secure session key distribution: the three party case
STOC '95 Proceedings of the twenty-seventh annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
STOC '98 Proceedings of the thirtieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Efficient Algorithms for Pairing-Based Cryptosystems
CRYPTO '02 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Key Distribution Systems Based on Identification Information
CRYPTO '87 A Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques on Advances in Cryptology
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
On the Risk of Opening Distributed Keys
CRYPTO '94 Proceedings of the 14th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
Protocols for Key Establishment and Authentication
EUROCRYPT'91 Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Efficient and provably-secure identity-based signatures and signcryption from bilinear maps
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
An efficient identity-based key exchange protocol with KGS forward secrecy for low-power devices
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
A new two-party identity-based authenticated key agreement
CT-RSA'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Topics in Cryptology
Certificateless undeniable signature scheme
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Efficient ID-based registration protocol featured with user anonymity in mobile IP networks
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
A pairing-free identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol with minimal message exchanges
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Universal authentication protocols for anonymous wireless communications
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Non-delegatable strong designated verifier signature using a trusted third party without pairings
AISC '13 Proceedings of the Eleventh Australasian Information Security Conference - Volume 138
Hi-index | 5.23 |
For an ID-based key exchange (KE) protocol, KGS forward secrecy is about the protection of previously established session keys after the master secret key of the Key Generation Server (KGS) is compromised. This is the strongest notion of forward secrecy that one can provide for an ID-based KE protocol. Among all the comparable protocols, there are only a few of them that provide this level of forward secrecy, and all of these protocols require expensive bilinear pairing operations and map-to-point hash operations that may not be suitable for implementation on low-power devices such as sensors. In this paper, we propose a new ID-based KE protocol which does not need any pairing or map-to-point hash operations. It also supports the strongest KGS forward secrecy. On its performance, we show that it is faster than previously proposed protocols in this category. Our protocol is a signature-based one, in which the signature scheme is a variant of a scheme proposed by Bellare et al. in Eurocrypt 2004. We show that the variant we proposed is secure, and also requires either less storage space or runtime computation than the original scheme.