Towards practical “proven secure” authenticated key distribution

  • Authors:
  • Yvo Desmedt;Mike Burmester

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Technion - Israel Institute of Technology, Technion-City, Haifa 32000, Israel and Department of EE & CS, Univ. of Wisconsin - Milwaukee, P.O. Box 784, WI, Milwaukee;Department of Mathematics, RH - University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX, U.K.

  • Venue:
  • CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 1993

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Abstract

Secure key distribution is a critical component in secure communications. Finding 'proven secure' practical key distribution systems is one of the major goals in cryptography. The Diffie-Hellman variants, a family of key distribution systems, achieve some of the objectives of this goal. In particular, the 'non-paradoxical' system (by Matsumoto-Takashima-Imai and Yacobi) is claimed to be secure against a known-key attack. In this paper we show that the argument used to prove this is flawed, and we explain how it can be fixed.