On security models and compilers for group key exchange protocols

  • Authors:
  • Emmanuel Bresson;Mark Manulis;Jörg Schwenk

  • Affiliations:
  • DCSSI Crypto Lab Paris;Horst Görtz Institute, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany;Horst Görtz Institute, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany

  • Venue:
  • IWSEC'07 Proceedings of the Security 2nd international conference on Advances in information and computer security
  • Year:
  • 2007

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Abstract

Group key exchange (GKE) protocols can be used to guarantee confidentiality and authentication in group applications. The paradigm of provable security subsumes an abstract formalization (security model) that considers the protocol environment and identifies its security goals. The first security model for GKE protocols was proposed by Bresson, Chevassut, Pointcheval, and Quisquater in 2001, and has been subsequently applied in many security proofs. Their definitions of AKE-security (authenticated key exchange; a.k.a. indistinguishability of the key) and MA-security (mutual authentication) became meanwhile standard. In this paper we analyze the BCPQ model and some of its variants and identify several risks resulting from its technical core construction - the notion of partnering. Consequently, we propose a revised model extending AKE- and MA-security in order to capture attacks by malicious participants and strong corruptions. Then, we turn to generic solutions (known as compilers) for AKE- and MA-security in BCPQ-like models. We describe a compiler C-AMA which provides AKE- and MA-security for any GKE protocol, under standard cryptographic assumptions, that eliminates some identified limitations in existing compilers.