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In this paper we make progress towards solving an open problem posed by Katz and Yung at CRYPTO 2003. We propose the first protocol for key exchange among n ≥2k+1 parties which simultaneously achieves all of the following properties: 1. Key Privacy (including forward security) against active attacks by group outsiders, 2. Non-malleability — meaning in particular that no subset of up to k corrupted group /insiders can ‘fix' the agreed key to a desired value, and 3. Robustness against denial of service attacks by up to k corrupted group insiders. Our insider security properties above are achieved assuming the availability of a reliable broadcast channel.