Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
An Efficient Protocol for Authenticated Key Agreement
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Provably Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange - The Dynamic Case
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
A One Round Protocol for Tripartite Diffie-Hellman
ANTS-IV Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Modeling insider attacks on group key-exchange protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure group key establishment revisited
International Journal of Information Security
Securing group key exchange against strong corruptions
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
Efficient One-Round Key Exchange in the Standard Model
ACISP '08 Proceedings of the 13th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
A Universally Composable Group Key Exchange Protocol with Minimum Communication Effort
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
A non-malleable group key exchange protocol robust against active insiders
ISC'06 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Information Security
VIETCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
Errors in computational complexity proofs for protocols
ASIACRYPT'05 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
HMQV: a high-performance secure diffie-hellman protocol
CRYPTO'05 Proceedings of the 25th annual international conference on Advances in Cryptology
Fully Robust Tree-Diffie-Hellman Group Key Exchange
CANS '09 Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Generic one round group key exchange in the standard model
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
Modeling leakage of ephemeral secrets in tripartite/group key exchange
ICISC'09 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Information security and cryptology
On the minimum communication effort for secure group key exchange
SAC'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Selected areas in cryptography
Stronger security model of group key agreement
Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security
Provably secure one-round identity-based authenticated asymmetric group key agreement protocol
Information Sciences: an International Journal
Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Flexible group key exchange with on-demand computation of subgroup keys
AFRICACRYPT'10 Proceedings of the Third international conference on Cryptology in Africa
Group key agreement for secure group communication in dynamic peer systems
Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing
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A key exchange protocol allows a set of parties to agree upon a secret session key over a public network. Two-party key exchange (2PKE) protocols have been rigorously analyzed under various models considering different adversarial actions. However, the analysis of group key exchange (GKE) protocols has not been as extensive as that of 2PKE protocols. Particularly, the security attribute of key compromise impersonation (KCI) resilience has so far been ignored for the case of GKE protocols. We first model the security of GKE protocols addressing KCI attacks by both outsider and insider adversaries. We then show that a few existing protocols are not secure even against outsider KCI attacks. The attacks on these protocols demonstrate the necessity of considering KCI resilience. Finally, we give a new proof of security for an existing GKE protocol under the revised model assuming random oracles.