Secure group key establishment revisited

Authors:
Jens-Matthias Bohli;María Isabel González Vasco;Rainer Steinwandt
Affiliations:
Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Institut für Algorithmen und Kognitive Systeme, 76128, Karlsruhe, Germany;Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Departamento de Matemática Aplicada, c/ Tulipán, s/n, 28933, Madrid, Spain;Florida Atlantic University, Department of Mathematical Sciences, 777 Glades Road, 33431, Boca Raton, FL, USA
Venue:
International Journal of Information Security
Year:
2007

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Abstract

We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. (LNCS 2248: 290–309, 2001; Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on computer and communications security (CCS-8), 2001) and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol participants. We show that established group key establishment schemes from CRYPTO 2003 and ASIACRYPT 2004 do not fully meet these new requirements. Next to giving a formal definition of these extended security properties, we prove a variant of the explored proposal from ASIACRYPT 2004 secure in this stricter sense. Our proof builds on the Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) assumption and the random oracle model.