Provably authenticated group Diffie-Hellman key exchange
CCS '01 Proceedings of the 8th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security
On Key Agreement and Conference Key Agreement
ACISP '97 Proceedings of the Second Australasian Conference on Information Security and Privacy
A Practical Public Key Cryptosystem Provably Secure Against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack
CRYPTO '98 Proceedings of the 18th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Dynamic Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange under Standard Assumptions
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Provably Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange - The Dynamic Case
ASIACRYPT '01 Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security: Advances in Cryptology
Round-Optimal Contributory Conference Key Agreement
PKC '03 Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Theory and Practice in Public Key Cryptography: Public Key Cryptography
Towards a classification of key agreement protocols
CSFW '95 Proceedings of the 8th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Modeling insider attacks on group key-exchange protocols
Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Secure group key establishment revisited
International Journal of Information Security
Securing group key exchange against strong corruptions
Proceedings of the 2008 ACM symposium on Information, computer and communications security
A Universally Composable Group Key Exchange Protocol with Minimum Communication Effort
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
One-round key exchange in the standard model
International Journal of Applied Cryptography
Modeling Key Compromise Impersonation Attacks on Group Key Exchange Protocols
Irvine Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography: PKC '09
On the connection between signcryption and one-pass key establishment
Cryptography and Coding'07 Proceedings of the 11th IMA international conference on Cryptography and coding
VIETCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the First international conference on Cryptology in Vietnam
Efficient key encapsulation to multiple parties
SCN'04 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Security in Communication Networks
Attribute-based authenticated key exchange
ACISP'10 Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy
Modeling key compromise impersonation attacks on group key exchange protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Bridging broadcast encryption and group key agreement
ASIACRYPT'11 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on The Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security
Strongly secure authenticated key exchange from factoring, codes, and lattices
PKC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography
Scalable deniable group key establishment
FPS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Foundations and Practice of Security
Exposure-resilient one-round tripartite key exchange without random oracles
ACNS'13 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Minimizing complexity of group key exchange (GKE) protocols is an important milestone towards their practical deployment. An interesting approach to achieve this goal is to simplify the design of GKE protocols by using generic building blocks. In this paper we investigate the possibility of founding GKE protocols based on a primitive called multi key encapsulation mechanism (mKEM) and describe advantages and limitations of this approach. In particular, we show how to design a one-round GKE protocol which satisfies the classical requirement of authenticated key exchange (AKE) security, yet without forward secrecy. As a result, we obtain the first one-round GKE protocol secure in the standard model. We also conduct our analysis using recent formal models that take into account both outsider and insider attacks as well as the notion of key compromise impersonation resilience (KCIR). In contrast to previous models we show how to model both outsider and insider KCIR within the definition of mutual authentication. Our analysis additionally implies that the insider security compiler by Katz and Shin from ACM CCS 2005 can be used to achieve more than what is shown in the original work, namely both outsider and insider KCIR.