One-round key exchange in the standard model

  • Authors:
  • Colin Boyd;Yvonne Cliff;Juan M. Gonzalez Nieto;Kenneth G. Paterson

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia.;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia.;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, GPO Box 2434 Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia.;Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK

  • Venue:
  • International Journal of Applied Cryptography
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how Key-Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the Random Oracle Model.