Efficient One-Round Key Exchange in the Standard Model

  • Authors:
  • Colin Boyd;Yvonne Cliff;Juan Gonzalez Nieto;Kenneth G. Paterson

  • Affiliations:
  • Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia Qld 4001;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia Qld 4001;Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia Qld 4001;Information Security Group, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham, Surrey, U.K. TW20 0EX

  • Venue:
  • ACISP '08 Proceedings of the 13th Australasian conference on Information Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 2008

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Abstract

We consider one-round key exchange protocols secure in the standard model. The security analysis uses the powerful security model of Canetti and Krawczyk and a natural extension of it to the ID-based setting. It is shown how KEMs can be used in a generic way to obtain two different protocol designs with progressively stronger security guarantees. A detailed analysis of the performance of the protocols is included; surprisingly, when instantiated with specific KEM constructions, the resulting protocols are competitive with the best previous schemes that have proofs only in the random oracle model.