Security Weakness in a Provable Secure Authentication Protocol Given Forward Secure Session Key

  • Authors:
  • Mijin Kim;Heasuk Jo;Seungjoo Kim;Dongho Won

  • Affiliations:
  • Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Korea 440-746;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Korea 440-746;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Korea 440-746;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon-si, Korea 440-746

  • Venue:
  • ICCSA '09 Proceedings of the International Conference on Computational Science and Its Applications: Part II
  • Year:
  • 2009

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Abstract

Shi, Jang and Yoo recently proposed a provable secure key distribution and authentication protocol between user, service provider and key distribution center(KDC). The protocol was based on symmetric cryptosystem, challenge-response, Diffie-Hellman component and hash function. Despite the claim of provable security, the protocol is in fact insecure in the presence of an active adversary. In this paper, we present the imperfection of Shi et al.'s protocol and suggest modifications to the protocol which would resolve the problem.