ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)
PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
A note on the use of timestamps as nonces
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
On key distribution protocols for repeated authentication
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Authentication in distributed systems: a bibliography
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Extending cryptographic logics of belief to key agreement protocols
CCS '93 Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Computer and communications security
An efficient and secure authentication protocol using uncertified keys
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
Timestamps in key distribution protocols
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Computation
Introduction to Mathematical Theory of Computation
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
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The researches on the cryptographic protocols, especially on the formal analysis methods, have been paid much attention to in the last two decades. However, the formal methods already presented can not perfectly prove a protocol really secure. In this paper, we unfold the properties that cryptographic protocols should possess and then prove, with respect to which, that the BAN-like logic tools have only limited capacity for proving a protocol really secure.