A Logical Language for Specifying Cryptographic Protocol Requirements

  • Authors:
  • Paul Syverson;Cathernine Meadows

  • Affiliations:
  • -;-

  • Venue:
  • SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
  • Year:
  • 1993

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Abstract

In this paper we present a formal language for specifying and reasoning about cryptographic protocol requirements. We give examples of simple sets of requirements in that language. We look at two versions of a protocol that might meet those requirements and show how to specify them in the language of the NRL Protocol Analyzer. [Mea91] [Mea92] We also show how to map one of our sets of formal reqmrements to the language of the NRL Protocol Analyzer and use the Analyzer to show that one version of the protocol meets those requirements. In other words, we use the Analyzer as a model checker to assess the validity of the formulae that make up the requirements.