Optimizing ML with run-time code generation
PLDI '96 Proceedings of the ACM SIGPLAN 1996 conference on Programming language design and implementation
BPF+: exploiting global data-flow optimization in a generalized packet filter architecture
Proceedings of the conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communication
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Journal of Computer Security
Fault-perserving simplifying transformations for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Authentication tests and the structure of bundles
Theoretical Computer Science
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Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
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CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
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Proceedings of the 16th international conference on World Wide Web
Authentication tests and disjoint encryption: A design method for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
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Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
Safely composing security protocols
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Programming cryptographic protocols
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Web services verification and prudent implementation
DPM'11 Proceedings of the 6th international conference, and 4th international conference on Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security
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We present an analysis that determines when it is possible to multiplex a pair of cryptographic protocols. We present a transformation that improves the coverage of this analysis on common protocol formulations. We discuss the gap between the merely possible and the pragmatic through an optimization that informs a multiplexer. We also address the security ramifications of trusting external parties for this task and evaluate our work on a large repository of cryptographic protocols. We have verified this work using the Coq proof assistant.