ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
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PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
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CAiSE '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering
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FORTE/PSTV 2000 Proceedings of the FIP TC6 WG6.1 Joint International Conference on Formal Description Techniques for Distributed Systems and Communication Protocols (FORTE XIII) and Protocol Specification, Testing and Verification (PSTV XX)
Model Checking Security Protocols Using a Logic of Belief
TACAS '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems: Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on the Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2000
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MASCOTS '99 Proceedings of the 7th International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 protocol
WOEC'96 Proceedings of the 2nd conference on Proceedings of the Second USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce - Volume 2
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
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The paper shows how a model checkable logic of belief and time (MATL) can be used to check properties of security protocols employed in computer networks. In MATL, entities participating to protocols are modeled as concurrent processes able to have beliefs about other entities. The approach is applied to the verification of TLS, the Internet Standard Protocol that IETF derived from the SSL 3.0 of Netscape. The results of our analysis show that the protocol satisfies all the security requirements for which it was designed.