Model Checking Security Protocols Using a Logic of Belief

Authors:
Massimo Benerecetti;Fausto Giunchiglia
Affiliations:
-;-
Venue:
TACAS '00 Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems: Held as Part of the European Joint Conferences on the Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2000
Year:
2000

Citing 4
Cited 2

A logic of authentication

ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
A semantics for a logic of authentication (extended abstract)

PODC '91 Proceedings of the tenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Model checking

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Deductive program design
Symbolic Model Checking

Symbolic Model Checking

Verification of Payment Protocols via MultiAgent Model Checking

CAiSE '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering
Verification of the SSL/TLS Protocol Using a Model Checkable Logic of Belief and Time

SAFECOMP '02 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security

Quantified Score

Hi-index	0.00

Visualization

Abstract

In this paper we show how model checking can be used for the verification of security protocols using a logic of belief. We model principals as processes able to have beliefs. The idea underlying the approach is to treat separately the temporal evolution and the belief aspects of principals. Therefore, when we consider the temporal evolution, belief formulae are treated as atomic propositions; while the fact that principal A has beliefs about another principal B is modeled as the fact that A has access to a representation of B as a process. As a motivating example, we use the framework proposed to formalize the Andrew protocol.