Verification of Payment Protocols via MultiAgent Model Checking
CAiSE '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Advanced Information Systems Engineering
Verification of the SSL/TLS Protocol Using a Model Checkable Logic of Belief and Time
SAFECOMP '02 Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security
Automatic verification of security in payment protocols for electronic commerce
Enterprise information systems IV
We Present a Complete Study Involving in the One Hand
QSIC '04 Proceedings of the Quality Software, Fourth International Conference
A flaw in the electronic commerce protocol SET
Information Processing Letters
Designing a special purpose e-commerce website
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Interaction Sciences: Information Technology, Culture and Human
A flaw in the electronic commerce protocol SET
Information Processing Letters
Formal analysis of the iKP electronic payment protocols
ISSS'02 Proceedings of the 2002 Mext-NSF-JSPS international conference on Software security: theories and systems
Secure transaction protocol analysis: models and applications
Secure transaction protocol analysis: models and applications
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We use model checking to establish five essential correctness properties of the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) protocol. SET has been developed jointly by Visa and MasterCard as a method to secure payment card transactions over open networks, and industrial interest in the protocol is high. Our main contributions are to firstly create a formal model of the protocol capturing the purchase request, payment authorization, and payment capture transactions. Together, these transactions constitute the kernel of the protocol. We then encoded our model and the aforementioned correctness properties in the input language of the FDR model checker. Running FDR on this input established that our model of the SET protocol satisfies all five properties even though the cardholder and merchant, two of the participants in the protocol, may try to behave dishonestly in certain ways. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to formalize the SET protocol for the purpose of model checking.