Using static analysis to validate the SAML single sign-on protocol

  • Authors:
  • Steffen M. Hansen;Jakob Skriver;Hanne Riis Nielson

  • Affiliations:
  • Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark;RADIOMETER MEDICAL ApS, Brønshøj - Denmark;Technical University of Denmark, Kongens Lyngby, Denmark

  • Venue:
  • WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
  • Year:
  • 2005

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Abstract

Previous studies have successfully used static analysis to automatically validate authentication and confidentiality properties of classical key distribution protocols. In this paper we show how the very same technique can be used to validate modern web-based protocols, in particular, we study the SAML Single Sign-On protocol. The description of the protocol does not supply any security analysis but only lists various recommendations. One of these is to use versions of the TLS protocol for establishing secure connections between the principals. Using our static analysis tool we illustrate how some instantiations of the Single Sign-On protocol are flawed whereas others are not.