Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Principles of Program Analysis
Principles of Program Analysis
Bit Commitment Using Pseudo-Randomness
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
CSFW '01 Proceedings of the 14th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Verifiable secret-ballot elections
Using static analysis to validate the SAML single sign-on protocol
WITS '05 Proceedings of the 2005 workshop on Issues in the theory of security
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
On the security of public key protocols
SFCS '81 Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Analysis of an electronic voting protocol in the applied pi calculus
ESOP'05 Proceedings of the 14th European conference on Programming Languages and Systems
Nordic Journal of Computing - Selected papers of the 17th nordic workshop on programming theory (NWPT'05), October 19-21, 2005
Approximation-based tree regular model-checking
Nordic Journal of Computing
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The desired security properties of electronic voting protocols include verifiability, accuracy, democracy and fairness. In this paper we use a static program analysis tool to validate these properties for one of the classical voting protocols under appropriate assumptions. The protocol is formalised in an extension of the LySa process calculus with blinding signatures. The analysis, which is fully automatic, pinpoints previously undiscovered flaws related to verifiability and accuracy and we suggest modifications of the protocol needed for validating these properties.