Security without identification: transaction systems to make big brother obsolete
Communications of the ACM
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
Communicating and mobile systems: the &pgr;-calculus
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Principles of Program Analysis
Principles of Program Analysis
Validating firewalls using flow logics
Theoretical Computer Science
A Practical Secret Voting Scheme for Large Scale Elections
ASIACRYPT '92 Proceedings of the Workshop on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
A calculus for control flow analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on security in global computing
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Static Validation of a Voting Protocol
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
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The classical key distribution protocols are based on symmetric and asymmetric encryption as well as digital signatures. Protocols with different purposes often requires different cryptographic primitives, an example is electronic voting protocols which are often based on the cryptographic operation blinding. In this paper we study the theoretical foundations for one of the successful approaches to validating cryptographic protocols and we extend it to handle the blinding primitive. Our static analysis approach is based on Flow Logic; this gives us a clean separation between the specification of the analysis and its realisation in an automatic tool. We concentrate on the former in the present paper and provide the semantic foundation for our analysis of protocols using blinding - also in the presence of malicious attackers.