ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
Handbook of theoretical computer science (vol. B)
ECAI '92 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Artificial intelligence
Temporal reasoning with abductive event calculus
ECAI '92 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Artificial intelligence
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
A Formal Language for Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Designs, Codes and Cryptography - Special issue dedicated to Gustavus J. Simmons
An attack on a recursive authentication protocol. A cautionary tale
Information Processing Letters
Inductive analysis of the Internet protocol TLS
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
Electronic Payment Systems
Logic programs with stable model semantics as a constraint programming paradigm
Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence
Smodels - An Implementation of the Stable Model and Well-Founded Semantics for Normal LP
LPNMR '97 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
Analyzing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol: A Comparison of Two Approaches
ESORICS '96 Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security: Computer Security
Kerberos Version 4: Inductive Analysis of the Secrecy Goals
ESORICS '98 Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Formal Verification of Cryptographic Protocols: A Survey
ASIACRYPT '94 Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptology: Advances in Cryptology
Encoding Planning Problems in Nonmonotonic Logic Programs
ECP '97 Proceedings of the 4th European Conference on Planning: Recent Advances in AI Planning
CAPSL Interface for the NRL Protocol Analyzer
ASSET '99 Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Application - Specific Systems and Software Engineering and Technology
Some new attacks upon security protocols
CSFW '96 Proceedings of the 9th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Hierarchy of Authentication Specifications
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
An Executable Specification Language for Planning Attacks to Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
What do we mean by entity authentication?
SP '96 Proceedings of the 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Verifying security protocols as planning in logic programming
ACM Transactions on Computational Logic (TOCL) - Special issue devoted to Robert A. Kowalski
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Formal verification of security protocols has become a key issue in computer security. Yet, it has proven to be a hard task often error prone and discouraging for non-experts in formal methods.In this paper we show how security protocols can be specified and verified efficiently and effectively by embedding reasoning about actions into a logic programming language.In a nutshell, we view a protocol trace as a plan to achieve a goal, so that protocol attacks are plans achieving goals that correspond to security violations. Building on results from logic programming and planning, we map the existence of an attack to a protocol into the existence of a model for the protocol specification that satisfies the specification of an attack. To streamline such way of modeling security protocols, we use a description language ALSP which makes it possible to describe protocols with declarative ease and to search for attacks by relying on efficient model finders (e.g. the smodels systems by Niemela and his group). This paper shows how to use ALSP for modeling two significant case studies in protocol verification: the classical Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol, and Aziz-Diffie Key agreement protocol for mobile communication.