Communicating sequential processes
Communicating sequential processes
Verifying Authentication Protocols in CSP
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Proving security protocols with model checkers by data independence techniques
Journal of Computer Security
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems
Communications of the ACM
Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers
Communications of the ACM
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
The Theory and Practice of Concurrency
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Concurrent and Real Time Systems: The CSP Approach
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
A Bound on Attacks on Authentication Protocols
TCS '02 Proceedings of the IFIP 17th World Computer Congress - TC1 Stream / 2nd IFIP International Conference on Theoretical Computer Science: Foundations of Information Technology in the Era of Networking and Mobile Computing
Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
CSFW '98 Proceedings of the 11th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Towards Automatic Verification of Authentication Protocols on an Unbounded Network
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Protocol Independence through Disjoint Encryption
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
How to Prevent Type Flaw Attacks on Security Protocols
CSFW '00 Proceedings of the 13th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
SP '00 Proceedings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Low-exponent RSA with related messages
EUROCRYPT'96 Proceedings of the 15th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
Proceedings of the 2003 workshop on New security paradigms
To infinity and beyond or, avoiding the infinite in security protocol analysis
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Embedding agents within the intruder to detect parallel attacks
Journal of Computer Security - Special issue on CSFW15
Soundness of removing cancellation identities in protocol analysis under Exclusive-OR
TOSCA'11 Proceedings of the 2011 international conference on Theory of Security and Applications
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Many methods of analysing security protocols have been proposed, but most such methods rely on analysing a protocol running only a finite network. Some, however--notably, data independence, the strand spaces model, and the rank functions model--can be used to prove correctness of a protocol running on an unbounded network.Roscoe and Broadfoot in [17] show how data independence techniques may be used to verify a security protocol running on an unbounded network. They also consider a weakness inherent in the RSA algorithm, discovered by Franklin and Reiter [3], and show that their data independence approach cannot deal with an intruder endowed with the ability to exploit this weakness.In this paper, we show that neither can the use of honest ideals in the strand spaces model or the use of rank functions in the CSP model be easily adapted to cover such an intruder. In each case, the inequality tests required to model the new intruder cause problems when attempting to extend analysis of a finite network to cover an unbounded network. The results suggest that more work is needed on adapting the intruder model to allow for cryptographic attacks.