To infinity and beyond or, avoiding the infinite in security protocol analysis

Authors:
James Heather;Steve Schneider
Affiliations:
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK;University of Surrey, Guildford, UK
Venue:
Proceedings of the 2006 ACM symposium on Applied computing
Year:
2006

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Abstract

We investigate conditions under which an infinite set of atomic messages can be replaced with one or two values without affecting the correctness of a security protocol. The work is conducted using the strand spaces formalism, but the results apply to all protocol analysis techniques, and should be of particular value to those using model checking.The implications of the central result are discussed.