Diffie-Hellman key distribution extended to group communication
CCS '96 Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Casper: a compiler for the analysis of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Mechanized proofs for a recursive authentication protocol
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
CVS: A Compiler for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
On Unifying Some Cryptographic Protocol Logics
SP '94 Proceedings of the 1994 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
New multiparty authentication services and key agreement protocols
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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The Cliques protocols are extensions of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to a group settings. In this paper, we are analyzing the A -GDH.2 suite that is intended to allow a group to share an authenticated key and to perform dynamic changes in the group constitution (adding and deleting member). We are proposing an original method to analyze these protocols and are presenting a number of unpublished flaws with respect to each of the main security properties claimed in protocol definitions (key authentication, perfect forward secrecy, resistance to known-keys attacks). Most of these flaws arise from the fact that using a group setting does not allow to reason about security properties in the same way as when only two (or three) parties are concerned.