A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosen-message attacks
SIAM Journal on Computing - Special issue on cryptography
A calculus for control flow analysis of security protocols
International Journal of Information Security - Special issue on security in global computing
Quantifying eavesdropping vulnerability in sensor networks
DMSN '05 Proceedings of the 2nd international workshop on Data management for sensor networks
Retrofitting Cyber Physical Systems for Survivability through External Coordination
HICSS '08 Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 41st Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences
Cyber Physical Systems: Design Challenges
ISORC '08 Proceedings of the 2008 11th IEEE Symposium on Object Oriented Real-Time Distributed Computing
Secure Control: Towards Survivable Cyber-Physical Systems
ICDCSW '08 Proceedings of the 2008 The 28th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems Workshops
Automatic verification of correspondences for security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
Degrees of security: protocol guarantees in the face of compromising adversaries
CSL'10/EACSL'10 Proceedings of the 24th international conference/19th annual conference on Computer science logic
COMPSACW '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 34th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference Workshops
Formal Reasoning about Physical Properties of Security Protocols
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Confidentiality Preserving Security Properties for Cyber-Physical Systems
COMPSAC '11 Proceedings of the 2011 IEEE 35th Annual Computer Software and Applications Conference
On the security of public key protocols
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
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The world of Cyber-Physical Systems ranges from industrial to national interest applications. Even though these systems are pervading our everyday life, we are still far from fully understanding their security properties. Devising a suitable attacker model is a crucial element when studying the security properties of CPSs, as a system cannot be secured without defining the threats it is subject to. In this work an attacker scenario is presented which addresses the peculiarities of a cyber-physical adversary, and we discuss how this scenario relates to other attacker models popular in the security protocol literature.