An efficient and secure authentication protocol using uncertified keys
ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
A calculus for cryptographic protocols
Information and Computation
A compiler for analyzing cryptographic protocols using noninterference
ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology (TOSEM)
Abuse-Free Optimistic Contract Signing
CRYPTO '99 Proceedings of the 19th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Casper: A Compiler for the Analysis of Security Protocols
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
ICSE '81 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Software engineering
Static validation of security protocols
Journal of Computer Security
On the semantics of Alice&Bob specifications of security protocols
Theoretical Computer Science - Automated reasoning for security protocol analysis
Secure Implementations for Typed Session Abstractions
CSF '07 Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
A formal semantics for protocol narrations
Theoretical Computer Science
Structured communication-centred programming for web services
ESOP'07 Proceedings of the 16th European conference on Programming
Compiling and verifying security protocols
LPAR'00 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Logic for programming and automated reasoning
Programming cryptographic protocols
TGC'05 Proceedings of the 1st international conference on Trustworthy global computing
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Cryptographic protocols are useful for engineering trust in transactions. There are several languages for describing these protocols, but these tend to capture the communications from the perspective of an individual role. In contrast, traditional protocol descriptions as found in a state of nature tend to employ a whole-protocol description, resulting in an impedance mismatch.In this paper we present two results to address this gap between human descriptions and deployable specifications. The first is an end-point projection technique that consumes an explicit whole-protocol description and generates specifications that capture the behavior of each participant role. In practice, however, many whole-protocol descriptions contain idiomatic forms of implicit specification. We therefore present our second result, a transformation that identifies and eliminates these implicit patterns, thereby preparing protocols for end-point projection.Concretely, our tools consume protocols written in our whole-protocol language, wppl, and generate role descriptions in the cryptographic protocol programming language, cppl. We have formalized and established properties of the transformations using the Coq proof assistant. We have validated our transformations by applying them successfully to most of the protocols in the sporerepository.