The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
Journal of Computer Security
MOCHA: Modularity in Model Checking
CAV '98 Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
The AVISS Security Protocol Analysis Tool
CAV '02 Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Aided Verification
Encrypted Key Exchange: Password-Based Protocols SecureAgainst Dictionary Attacks
SP '92 Proceedings of the 1992 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
The modelling and analysis of security protocols: the csp approach
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Organizations need to develop formally analyzed systems in order to achieve well-known formal method benefits. In order to study the security of communication systems, we have developed a methodology for the application of the formal analysis techniques, commonly used in communication protocols, to the analysis of cryptographic protocols. In particular, we have extended the design and analysis phases with security properties. Our proposal uses a specification notation based on one of the most used standard requirement languages, HMSC/MSC, which can be automatically translated into a generic SDL specification. The SDL system obtained can then be used for the analysis of the addressed security properties, by using an observer process schema. Besides our main goal to provide a notation for describing the formal specification of security systems, our proposal also brings additional benefits, such as the study of the possible attacks to the system, and the possibility of re-using the specifications produced to describe and analyze more complex systems.